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Abstract.  
It is often assumed, particularly by outsiders, that the conflict in Northern Ireland, 
known euphemistically as ‘the Troubles’, in which some 3,600 people lost their lives, 
was an atavistic throwback to Europe’s religious wars of earlier centuries.  In 1979, by 
which time some 2,000 people had already been killed in the Troubles, Pope John 
Paul II proposed to pay a visit to Ireland, and perhaps to cross the border into Ulster’s 
sectarian cockpit.  The idea provoked outrage from some Ulster protestants and high 
anxiety for the British, concerned that the Pope might inadvertently enflame the 
situation or embarrass the British by raising difficult issues.  But there were hopes too 
that an unequivocal condemnation of violence by the head of the Catholic Church, 
might help to bring the conflict to an end.  This article, based on extensive research in 
diplomatic archives, reveals deep divisions within the Catholic Church on the Irish 
question and points to the power and limitations of the British diplomatic reach into the 
Vatican.  It reveals also, however, the powerlessness of prayer and pleadings in the 
face of terrorist violence.     
I. Ireland’s Troubles
In December 1978, Pope John Paul II was invited by the Irish Roman Catholic 
Hierarchy, to make a pastoral visit to Ireland.  No Pope had ever visited that 
predominantly and fervently Catholic country, while the new Pope, elected in only the 
previous March, had already attracted great warmth and enthusiasm amongst 
Catholics everywhere.  It was hoped that a visit could be arranged to mark the 
centenary of a supposed Marian apparition at Knock in Co. Donegal.  In the 1970s, in 
any ‘normal’ Catholic country, a visit by a new and already popular pontiff would have 
been a cause of untrammelled celebration.  The proposed visit, however, was 
controversial from the outset and questions were immediately raised as to whether the 
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Pope would visit Northern Ireland, by then embroiled in a ten-year-old bloody conflict 
known euphemistically as ‘the Troubles’.   Those who welcomed the Pope’s visit hoped 
that a passionate appeal for peace from a man many regarded already as a living 
saint, might persuade the Catholic Irish Republican Army (IRA) to lay down its arms.  
Others, notably in the British government, feared that his visit would only enflame the 
situation, since many Northern Irish protestants regarded the possibility of a papal 
presence in Protestant Ulster as an impertinent and unwelcome intrusion.  The public 
and private controversies which followed the announcement of the invitation, reveal a 
good deal about Ireland north and south, and about the nature of the conflict there.  It 
is also revealing about the internal politics of the Vatican and the quiet power of the 
British diplomatic machine.
Ireland was not of course, a ‘normal’ Catholic country.  After centuries of half-
hearted attempts by English monarchs to conquer Ireland, she was brought to heel in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in the midst of Protestant England’s struggles 
with Catholic Spain.  The Reformation, however, did not take hold in Ireland, despite 
the efforts of successive British governments to ‘plant’ the island with Scots and 
English Protestant settlers.  Protestantism was associated by the native Irish with 
foreign usurpation, and while they could not fend off the latter, they refused to accept 
the former.  A French-inspired republican rebellion in 1798 prompted the British to 
absorb the whole country into the United Kingdom in 1801.  However, the promise to 
incorporate Irish Catholics into this quintessentially Protestant state, by allowing their 
representatives to sit in Parliament, was broken.  ‘Catholic Emancipation’ was only 
granted in 1829, after the government was terrified into submission by Daniel 
O’Connell’s extraordinary mobilisation of huge numbers of Irish Catholics in ‘monster 
meetings’.  However, O’Connell represented only the peaceful, constitutional strain of 
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Irish nationalism.  The ‘physical-force’ tradition remained alive and manifested itself in 
the Young Ireland movement in the 1840s, and the terrorist Fenian organisation from 
the 1860s onwards.  These were minority movements, however, and by the early 
twentieth century, Ireland was a relatively peaceful and prosperous part of the United 
Kingdom.  Nevertheless, the desire among Irish Catholics for some form of institutional 
recognition of Irish nationality had not been extinguished and was embodied now in 
the ‘Home Rule’ demand for devolution for Ireland within the UK.  The stubborn 
resistance of Irish Protestants, however, to any constitutional innovations which might 
subject them to ‘Rome Rule’, repeatedly thwarted accommodation or compromise.  
Ironically enough, the consequence was the outbreak yet again of violent rebellion in 
Ireland, in the midst of the First World War, and the rebirth of the republican demand 
for complete Irish independence.   By 1921, after years of exhausting conflict, the 
British determined to solve the Irish problem by partitioning the island, creating the 
overwhelmingly Catholic Irish Free State, independent in all but name, and the statelet 
of Northern Ireland, two thirds Protestant and still within the UK, but with its own 
devolved parliament and government.  This ‘solution’ lasted for fifty years.1   
Partition was supposed to have created a state in Northern Ireland with a 
sufficiently large Protestant majority to ensure stability.  Nevertheless, the Catholic 
third of the population felt no allegiance to it, and the state made no effort to attract it.  
Proportional representation at local and regional electoral levels, intended by the 
architects of the 1921 settlement to protect the minority community, was abolished.  
The Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act of 1922, gave the state draconian security 
powers, while there was systematic gerrymandering of electoral boundaries to ensure 
Protestant-unionist control even in Catholic-nationalist areas.  There were also 
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widespread allegations of discrimination against Catholics in public- and private-sector 
employment and in the allocation of social housing.  
A campaign, inspired by the US Civil Rights movement, to protest against these 
conditions arose in the late 1960s, taking the form of demonstrations, ‘sit-ins’ and other 
peaceful protests.  The Prime Minister, Terence O’Neill, reformist in ambition, was 
unable actually to produce any serious reforms, opposed as he was by many within 
the Unionist Party, and harassed as he was, unrelentingly, by the evangelical 
Protestant clergyman, the Reverend Ian Paisley.  The failure of the state seriously to 
address Catholic-nationalist grievances, other than with apparent and well-publicised 
police brutality, led to explosive street violence in the summer of 1969.  The British 
Army had to be deployed onto the streets to prevent a civil war.  In the political 
stalemate which followed, a faction of the hitherto dormant Irish Republican Army 
(IRA), styling itself ‘the Provisionals’, broke away from the organisation and began in 
1970 a campaign of bombing and assassination of policemen and then of British 
soldiers.  The Provisionals were often outmatched in their savagery by gangs of pro-
British Protestant death squads, who ruthlessly targeted Catholic civilians for brutal 
murder.  Between them, the terrorists and the intransigent majority of Protestant 
unionists, managed to thwart British government attempts to foist a ‘power-sharing’ 
settlement on Northern Ireland and by the mid-1970s, the British had settled on a 
policy of containment.2  
Part of this policy of so-called ‘normalisation’ involved the removal of ‘special 
category’ status for convicted terrorists, which had hitherto accorded them prisoner-
of-war status in all but name.  In response to this, IRA prisoners in the ‘H-Block’ wings 
of the Maze prison had begun a ‘dirty protest’, refusing to wear prison uniform, or to 
leave their cells, instead smearing their excrement on cell walls.3  Over three-hundred-
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and-fifty IRA prisoners were living in these conditions by the summer of 1979, adding 
an extra level of toxicity to a situation which had reached a dreadful impasse.4  The 
murderous campaigns of the terrorists continued unabated and the British Army was 
obliged to act as an army of occupation of nationalist areas.  There were widespread 
and widely believed allegations that the police, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), 
routinely beat terrorist suspects to extract confessions.  There seemed no hope of any 
political progress.  In these circumstances, the idea that the Pope might pay a visit to 
this sectarian cockpit, was always going to be problematic. 
II. Invitation to the Pope
In fact, there was some concern in British official circles about the Pope visiting 
any part of Ireland.  In March 1979, before the Vatican had made up its mind about 
whether or not to accept the invitation, the UK’s Minister to the Holy See, Geoffrey 
Crossley, wondered whether the British should consider ‘with the greatest possible 
tact, to discourage the idea.’  A papal visit to Ireland ‘would underline the division 
between Northern and Southern Ireland’ and might increase ‘Catholic restiveness 
about the division’.5  However, his instructions from London were to say nothing about 
it, as it was felt that there would be a ‘major row if word got around that HMG [Her 
Majesty’s Government] had sought actively to discourage a papal visit’.6  By mid-May 
there was still no response from the Vatican to the Hierarchy’s invitation, despite 
intense speculation in the Irish newspapers.7  
The source of the uncertainty can be found in John Paul’s personal impetuosity 
and unpredictability, which did cause concern among the professional Vatican 
diplomats.  By early July, he had still not made up his mind about a visit to Ireland.  
Audrys Bačkis (the Vatican’s Deputy Foreign Minister) told Crossley that the diplomats 
were concerned that he might take them all by surprise by a sudden independent 
7 | P a g e
decision to go.8  More tellingly, in a private discussion in November 1977 with 
Crossley’s predecessor, Cardinal Secretary of State Agostino Casaroli had 
complained about the lack of political awareness of many senior clergymen: ‘Woiteva 
[sic] of Cracow was the most saintly man, but without an ounce of political sense.’9
Crossley received his first strong steer that a visit to Ireland was on the cards 
from Substitute Secretary of State (Deputy Prime Minister) Martinez on 20 July.  
Martinez confirmed as true the rumours that the Pope would address the UN General 
Assembly, and that it was also probable that en route to the United States, he would 
visit Ireland.  Later that evening, the story about the UN speech broke in New York, 
taking the Vatican by surprise and a hastily arranged press conference took place in 
the Vatican on 21 July to confirm the Irish visit.  The premature disclosure of news of 
the visit meant that the trip to Ireland became public knowledge before an itinerary had 
been agreed, providing immediate scope for speculation and confusion about the 
inclusion of Northern Ireland in the visit.   Cardinal Ó Fiaich, the Roman Catholic 
Primate, held his own press conference at Maynooth the same day, and questions 
concentrated on the issue of whether the Pope would travel over the border into 
Northern Ireland.  This was an issue because, like all of the major churches in Ireland, 
the Roman Catholic Church was organised on an all-Ireland basis.  The primatial see 
was based in Armagh in Northern Ireland and many dioceses straddled the border.  
The Papal Nuncio, Archbishop Gaetano Alibrandi had responsibility for reporting to 
the Vatican on issues affecting Catholics in Northern Ireland as well as the Republic 
and Cardinal Ó Fiaich was himself a native of Northern Ireland.  Ó Fiaich effectively 
stone-walled.  He said the bishops had not discussed the itinerary with either the 
British or Irish governments or the Northern Ireland authorities, and that all discussions 
would be conducted through Rome.  He also said that he had no information that 
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Vatican officials were advising against a visit North on security grounds.10   However, 
Ó Fiaich did discuss the itinerary with the prime minister of the Irish Republic 
(Taoiseach) Jack Lynch at a meeting in Dublin on 23 July, a meeting held at Ó Fiaich’s 
request.  Ó Fiaich said that he had been questioned about a visit North at the press 
conference the previous Saturday and had replied that ‘no place in Ireland was 
excluded’.  It was untrue however, that Ó Fiaich had ‘no information’ about what 
Vatican officials were advising, since he told Lynch that the impression that he and Dr 
Ryan, the Archbishop of Dublin, had gained on a recent visit to Rome was that the 
Secretariat of State were advising the Pope to confine his visit to the Republic.  Lynch 
said that his recommendation would be that the North should be included as its 
omission would highlight the existence of the border and would be regarded as a 
victory for Paisley.11
Ian Paisley, by now a senior member of the British parliament, had indeed 
immediately launched what The Economist described as a ‘noisy campaign’ to keep 
the Pope out of Northern Ireland.  ‘Mr Paisley seized the news of the Pope’s visit to 
quote from the Westminster conference of 1648, the Presbyterians’ creed, which calls 
the Pope the “anti-Christ” and “a man of sin in the church”.’12  On 24 July, the BBC 
reported him as declaring that any visit North by the Pope would be ‘outrageous’.  
Paisley’s campaign was widely reported in all the Irish papers and provided the main 
headline in the Irish Independent: ‘No Pope Here!’13  However, as might well be 
imagined in Northern Ireland, the issue immediately became party-political, with Gerry 
Fitt of the Catholic-nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) taking up 
the cudgels on the Pope’s behalf.  And much to its discomfiture, the British 
Government was soon dragged into the affair, partly perhaps, due to the inexperience 
of the new Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher.  Fitt and Paisley had clashed in the 
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Commons about the proposed visit, with Fitt declaring that Paisley’s opposition was 
‘driving people into the arms of the IRA’.14  Paisley responded that ‘the gauntlet is 
thrown down to the Protestant people of Northern Ireland, and I am happy to take it 
up. Evangelical Protestantism in Ulster will win.’15
But it was Fitt who first raised the issue of getting the Pope to attempt to 
dissuade young men in Northern Ireland from supporting the IRA.  He told Humphrey 
Atkins, the British minister responsible for Northern Ireland, that an intervention by the 
Pope ‘might end the violence’.16  He also told Prime Minister Thatcher that the visit 
was a unique opportunity for the Catholics in Northern Ireland to see the head of their 
church and that it would be widely felt that if the visit did not take place, it would be the 
fault of Mr Paisley.  The Prime Minister, with no understanding of the snares that await 
those who carelessly ventured into the jungle of Ulster’s sectarian politics, told Fitt that 
no request for a visit had been received from the Vatican but if one were, the Pope 
would be a welcome visitor to the United Kingdom.  No doubt Mrs Thatcher thought 
that her carefully chosen words about the Pope being welcome to ‘the United Kingdom’ 
would have satisfied Fitt, without inflaming the situation.  But only two hours later, the 
following item appeared in the Press Association tapes: ‘Pope welcome in Ulster’.  
Predictably, Paisley was on the telephone to exasperated British officials within half 
an hour. He was ‘deeply concerned’ to hear that Mrs Thatcher had made such a 
statement.  He emphasised several times that the situation in Northern Ireland was 
now extremely serious as a result of these statements and that ‘we were sitting on a 
powder keg’.  If the elected representatives of the people of Northern Ireland could not 
be heard, he, Mr Paisley, could not be held responsible for the consequences.17  Fitt 
gleefully made the most of the situation, telling the press that Mrs Thatcher’s words of 
welcome were ‘a kick in the teeth’ for Mr Paisley.18   They were nothing of the kind of 
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course, but in the ‘zero-sum’ game which was Ulster politics, whatever upset one side 
was guaranteed to delight the other.
However, it was not just the extremist-Protestant element who objected to the 
possibility of a papal visit North and it is a reflection of the realities of sectarianism in 
Northern Ireland that ‘moderate’ Unionist political leaders also took exception.  Jim 
Molyneaux, leader of the Official Unionist Party (OUP), wrote to Atkins to the effect 
that any such visit would be ‘calamitous’.  It would be ‘tantamount to treating Ulster in 
the face of the world not as a part of the United Kingdom, but as a part of Ireland.  This 
demonstration by the Vatican, acquiesced in by Her Majesty’s Government, would give 
immense encouragement to the IRA and its supporters active and passive throughout 
the world, with a consequential cost in human life in the long run which it is not possible 
to estimate’.  One official scribbled – presumably sarcastically – on Molyneaux’s letter, 
‘good moderate Prod opinion!’19 
III. The Diplomatic Machine at Work
Despite what Mrs Thatcher had told Fitt however, Downing Street, the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) were alarmed 
at the prospect of a visit North.  Atkins told his colleagues that were the Pope to decide 
to visit Armagh ‘it would be hard to do other than agree, notwithstanding the strong 
feeling this would arouse in part of the Protestant population and the possibility or 
likelihood of Dr Paisley leading a hostile demonstration’.20  But in order to understand 
why the prospect of strong feelings being aroused should cause such anxiety in 
Whitehall, one needs to be conscious of the realities of daily life in Northern Ireland in 
this period.  Statistics alone cannot convey the misery, suffering and inter-communal 
animosities generated by the relentless cycles of violence.  For instance, on 4 
February 1979, Patrick Mackin, a Catholic former prison officer, was murdered at his 
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home, along with his wife Violet, by an IRA gang.  On 14 February, Steven Kirby, a 
twenty-two-year-old British soldier was shot dead by an IRA sniper.  On 24 February, 
sixteen-year-old Martin McGuigan and sixteen-year-old James Keenan, both 
Catholics, were killed by a remote-controlled IRA bomb, hidden in a trailer and 
intended for British troops.  On 20 March 1979, twenty-year-old Robert McNally died, 
a week after a bomb exploded under his car.  He had been a member of the Ulster 
Defence Regiment (UDR), a locally recruited regiment of the British Army.  On 30 
March, Martin McConville, a twenty-five-year-old Catholic civilian, was beaten to death 
by an unspecified loyalist paramilitary group.  On 17 April, four members of the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary, all Protestants, were killed when a remote-controlled bomb, 
hidden in a parked van, was detonated by the IRA when their mobile patrol drove past.  
On 19 May, Jack McClenaghan, a sixty-four-year-old Protestant, and former member 
of the UDR, was murdered by the IRA while delivering bread.  The following day the 
IRA murdered Stanley Wray, aged fifty, an RUC officer, as he was leaving church.  On 
20 June, Francis Sullivan, aged thirty-six, a Catholic civilian, was murdered by a 
loyalist paramilitary group in his own home.  On 19 July, shortly before the Pope’s visit 
was announced, thirty-one-year-old Protestant civilian Sylvia Crowe was killed when 
an IRA bomb, hidden in a parked van, exploded.  It had been intended for members 
of a passing UDR patrol.21  In such circumstances, it is not hard to see how the 
prospect of a papal visit, with vast crowds of celebrating Catholics and Paisleyite 
protestors, gave rise to serious concerns. 
Immediately therefore British officials began working on plans to make it clear 
to the Vatican, in the politest possible terms, ‘that our first choice would be that the 
Pope did not go’ to Northern Ireland.22  The original plan to ‘smoke out’ the Vatican 
however, was made ‘somewhat warmer’, with some unsubtle hints about the security 
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implications.  Crossley was to say that HMG ‘would welcome the opportunity of 
considering a request to [visit] informally so that they could consider and advise the 
Pope about all aspects of such a visit in terms of its effect upon the two communities 
in Northern Ireland and their security.’23  There was also a real concern, given the 
‘barely credible’ way in which the Vatican had failed to consult the Dublin government 
about the visit, that the Vatican might not consult HMG about a visit North.  ‘This would 
place us in a most embarrassing position, not least vis-à-vis Dr Paisley.’24
Crossley met his Vatican contacts on the evening of Thursday 26 July and was 
told that the Pope did not intend and had never intended to visit Northern Ireland.  The 
Duke of Norfolk confirmed that he had heard the same thing from Bruno Heim, the 
Apostolic Delegate to Great Britain, so ‘that was that’.25  However, the attention of 
British officials now turned to anxiety about what the Pope might say and who he might 
meet on his visit to the Republic, and their plans to influence him reveal a good deal 
about the workings of the Whitehall ‘information-management’ machine.  In early 
August, John Marshall of the NIO sent an intriguing memorandum to his superior Ken 
Stowe, urging action ‘since no doubt drafts of speeches will already be gestating in 
Rome.’  Marshall argued that while it was unlikely that the Pope would say anything 
touching on the political problems flowing from partition, ‘there must remain a 
possibility that, under the guidance of the Papal Nuncio in Dublin (or his own Irish 
assistant in Rome) he may be persuaded to use some carefully composed form of 
words which proves capable of being interpreted as in favour of Irish unity; and this 
could provoke Protestant feeling in the North.  We must guard against this.’  The 
pope’s ‘Irish assistant’ was Fr John Magee, a native of Newry, a staunchly nationalist 
town in Northern Ireland.
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Marshall went on to suggest that the one thing the Pope was most likely to do 
was to condemn violence.  ‘We should consider if there is anything we can do to 
influence such a statement so as to make it positively helpful to us.’  Marshall was 
concerned also about what the Pope might say which would be damaging to Britain’s 
case, and to seek ways to stop him. ‘The most emotive area on which he might 
trespass is human rights.  Allegations of ill-treatment by the RUC are credited in places 
other than Ireland; and the H-Blocks are always a good issue – and we know that 
Cardinal Ó Fiaich is less than well-disposed towards us on that problem.  We therefore 
need to head off trouble’.  He then went on to set out a list of ‘important facts’ about 
the Northern Ireland situation,  ‘to ensure the Pope (or his immediate advisers) do not 
slip, from ignorance, into saying unhelpful things.’ However, as well as seeking to 
acquaint the Pope with these ‘facts’, Marshall went further.  ‘If he makes any reference 
to the political scene, the Pope should bear in mind the likely reaction of the 
Protestants in the North.  Thus, a plug by him for Irish unity could only set back the 
chances of achieving it ... If he condemns violence … it would be the more helpful the 
more he is able to sharpen and narrow the point of what he says.  Thus, a 
condemnation of violence engaged in for political ends would be more valuable than 
a more general statement; and if he were willing to speak against those who help, 
assist, comfort, support the terrorist, whether actively or by passively failing to co-
operate with those forces who risk their lives to protect all members of the community, 
that would be better still.’  In short, the NIO were hoping that the Pope would not just 
condemn terrorism, but enjoin his flock to support the police and the criminal justice 
system, both of which they profoundly distrusted. On the question of channels, 
Marshall agreed with Crossley’s suggestion that he should be used, and suggested 
the normal diplomatic channels for conveying the ‘factual information’.  However, he 
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suggested using the Apostolic Delegate to the UK, Archbishop Heim, to urge the Pope 
not to say anything in support of Irish unity, but rather to stick to condemning violence 
and if possible, garner support for the security forces.  Archbishop Heim, wrote 
Marshall, was ‘a man very sympathetic to HMG on Northern Ireland’.26  There was 
also concern however, that news of the attempt to influence what the Pope would say 
would leak out.  ‘A difficulty is that unless approaches were made with extreme care, 
they could backlash.  If there were a leak that we were trying to influence the Pope 
over any statements he might make about Northern Ireland, we would be laying 
ourselves open to our critics throughout Ireland and in the United States.’27
As anxieties grew in the NIO and the FCO about what Ken Stowe of the NIO 
called the pressure of an ‘uncomfortably consistent kind’ to arrange a visit North, it 
became apparent that while Crossley was able to get assurances from senior 
members of the Vatican Secretariat that the position had not changed, ‘they do not 
themselves have complete control over what the Pope says and does!’28  Crossley 
told Ewen Fergusson, Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, of his growing impression that the Pope ‘keeps the Curia guessing even at the 
very top, and I sense an uneasy feeling on their part that with this independent and 
unbureaucratic Pope, who sometimes disregards their rules and procedures, they are 
never absolutely sure that they are fully in the picture.’  Crossley went on to state his 
concerns about the sources of the Pope’s information about Ireland: ‘this leaves me 
with the unsatisfactory feeling that there can be no guarantee that the Pope might not 
occasionally strike off at an independent tangent and it is to be feared that he is 
exposed to an emotional and not necessarily unbiased view of Irish affairs in his 
contacts with Ó Fiaich, his Private Secretary, Magee (who comes from Newry in 
Northern Ireland), and the Papal Nuncio in Dublin, whose blinkered views are known 
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to us.’  A source of optimism for Crossley was that his main contacts in the Vatican, 
the Secretary of State, Casaroli, the Head of the Council of Public Affairs of the 
Church, Silvestrini, and his Deputy, Bačkis ‘are all very sound on the Irish problem and 
are very good friends of ours.’  Crossley was assured that the Pope would ask for 
briefs and would use them.  ‘It is to be hoped that he will stick to them.  It is here that 
the information fed in by the Apostolic Delegate Heim and this Legation should exert 
its influence.’29
IV. Heim v Alibrandi
The references to the Papal Nuncio, Alibrandi, in Dublin and to the Apostolic Delegate 
Bruno Heim, are significant here, since the relationships between and activities of 
these two senior Roman Catholic diplomats, undermine the common assumption that 
the Vatican is an ideological monolith with a single world view.  Alibrandi was an 
experienced Vatican diplomat who had been based in Dublin since 1969.  However, 
he had a very bad reputation amongst British diplomats and politicians, who regarded 
him as anti-British and effectively pro-IRA.  Back in 1976, Alibrandi had been described 
by John Hickman of the British Embassy in Dublin as ‘an unimpressive and (in English) 
extremely inarticulate Italian’ with a ‘dim personality’ and ‘politically irredeemable’.30  
In May 1978, JDW Janes of the NIO described him as a ‘card carrying member of 
PIRA’.31  There were also concerns about Alibrandi’s closeness to supporters of the 
IRA H-Block protestors in the Maze Prison, and about the interpretation of the protest 
being transmitted by Alibrandi to the Vatican.  He had received a delegation from the 
Relatives Action Committee from Andersonstown in February 1978 and had promised 
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to deliver a petition on their behalf to the Pope.32  However, Alibrandi was also a 
source of embarrassment for the government of the Republic.  One Irish diplomat 
(assumed by British officials to be David Donoghue of the Irish Mission to the Holy 
See), apparently said that Alibrandi was an ‘out and out Provisional’ who had played 
a key role in the appointment of the unashamedly nationalist Archbishop Ó Fiaich.33   
According to former Irish diplomat Sean Donlon, Alibrandi had been in contact with 
leading IRA men and had even given sanctuary to IRA members ‘on the run’ in his 
nunciature.  Representations were made to the Holy See about moving Alibrandi from 
Dublin, but to no avail.34
Bruno Heim was a very different character and had long since been regarded 
as a ‘useful ally’ by the British.  Along with Crossley, and to a lesser extent Cardinal 
Basil Hume, Heim was regarded by the British as their key link with the Vatican.  Heim, 
a Swiss national, was a highly experienced diplomat, and had been appointed 
Apostolic Delegate in London in July 1973.  At this time, the UK did not have full 
diplomatic relations with the Vatican, so that Heim did not have the status of an 
ambassador.  Nor did he have any responsibility for ecclesiastical matters in any part 
of Ireland.  However, he had already proved useful to the British in the past.  Heim had 
three times met Atkins’ predecessor, Roy Mason, first with Cardinal Basil Hume on 6 
July 1977 and then again, this time alone, on 15 February 1978 and then again with 
Hume and other Catholic worthies on 26 April 1978.  The first meeting was arranged 
to enable HMG to convey to the Roman Catholic Church informally their views on the 
qualities they thought were needed in a new Archbishop at Armagh, following the 
death in April 1977 of Cardinal Conway ‘and to seek to influence choice.’35  Ó Fiaich 
was appointed by the Vatican in August, and quickly irked the British with his 
outspoken support for a British declaration of intent to withdraw from Northern Ireland.  
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Heim told Mason that while he had formed a favourable impression of Ó Fiaich in 
human terms, ‘he had been distressed by the intervention into the controversial, 
political sphere.’  Heim offered ‘to help in any way which HMG thought would be useful’ 
and later told an official  that he was ‘concerned to brief the Holy See fully on HMG’s 
views, since it was his impression that the Papal Nuncio in the Republic inevitably saw 
the situation from the perspective of Dublin.’36    And while there was some anxiety in 
the NIO that Alibrandi and Ó Fiaich might take exception to the NIO setting up Heim 
as ‘an alternative channel to the Vatican’, the prevailing view appeared to be that ‘we 
owe nothing to Alibrandi.  We need have no qualms about cooperating with Heim if he 
is willing to be helpful.  The Irish exploit the situation.’37  In August 1978, Ó Fiaich 
visited the Maze prison and expressed publicly his revulsion at the conditions there, 
without making it clear that the prisoners themselves were responsible for them.  The 
NIO sent briefings prepared for MPs on the prison protest to Heim since ‘Mr Mason is 
most anxious that the Roman Catholic authorities should be fully aware of the true 
position regarding the situation in the Maze Prison.’38  Heim passed these to the 
Vatican and claimed to have ‘twice recently informed the Vatican of the true state of 
affairs and that the situation in the Maze was created entirely by the men themselves.’ 
He claimed also that from time to time pressure was applied on the Vatican to 
intervene in the prisons issue and that the Vatican invariably sought advice from him 
and that he had consistently advised the Vatican not to intervene.39
But now because of the Pope’s visit and what the British regarded as the malign 
influence of Alibrandi and Ó Fiaich, Heim was needed more than ever.  And the 
concerns of British officials were not assuaged by a press release from the National 
Organising Committee for the visit, released on 9 August 1979, which referred 
ambiguously to a ‘working hypothesis’ that the visit would include a ‘site in the Armagh 
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province’, which of course, straddled the border.40  There was even greater alarm later 
in the month at the reported comments of Cardinal Alibrandi on the lines that it was 
‘more than probable that the Holy Father will visit Northern Ireland.  As a Pole who has 
suffered so much, the Pope is interested in the suffering of others and wishes to give 
encouragement to all people suffering from oppression’.  Crossley immediately made 
contact with the Vatican Foreign Minister, Monsignor Achille Silvestrini, who was 
‘extremely angry’ at what he heard.  If such a statement had been made as reported 
it was ‘incredible and a stupidity.’  He apologised to Crossley for the fact that a 
diplomatic representative of the Holy See should have made an unauthorised 
statement outside his competence on so delicate an issue.  Crossley told him that the 
parallel with Poland was totally misleading since one of the basic facts of the problem 
in Northern Ireland is that the majority there insist on the British presence.  Silvestrini 
‘agreed entirely’ and asked Crossley to refrain from communicating with London until 
he could find out the result of Casaroli’s discussion with the Pope the previous day (23 
August).  Two hours later however, the situation was more fluid.  There was a feeling 
in Ireland, Silvestrini said, that for the Pope to go to a point in the diocese of Armagh 
without going to its seat would be like going to Ostia without going to Rome.  Moreover, 
an invitation for the Pope to visit Armagh had that morning reached the Vatican from 
the Anglican bishop of Armagh.  He thought this curious but it did seem to indicate that 
there was almost an agreement on the spot between Anglicans and Catholics.  
Silvestrini stressed that the visit to Ireland would be on the religious plane and would 
urge pacification and reconciliation.  Crossley hoped that there was no danger of any 
announcement of any wish to visit the North without prior consultation with HMG.  
Silvestrini agreed and said Casaroli had instructed Ó Fiaich to make no statement.  He 
repeated that up to the previous day he had had no inkling of any change ‘but that he 
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had not expected the Nuncio in Dublin to twist the Vatican’s elbow.’  Casaroli would 
be reprimanding Alibrandi.  ‘But given the climate in Dublin the Vatican must study the 
situation with Ó Fiaich and Crossley would at once be given priority access to the 
Secretary of State to hear the outcome’.  Crossley concluded: ‘It seems likely in my 
view that we shall be asked to agree a visit to the town of Armagh’.41  So despite the 
influence of the diplomatic machine, the mercurial John Paul had made up his mind to 
visit Armagh and there was to be no question of prior consultation with HMG.
So great were the anxieties of the British at their failure to dissuade the Pope 
from travelling to the North, that serious consideration was being given to withholding 
permission entirely, despite the inevitable diplomatic fall out.  After all, the Pope had 
even been permitted by the Communist government of Poland to visit his native land 
the previous June.  Part of the problem for the British was the unwillingness or inability 
of the Vatican to be clear about what was intended.  If all that the Vatican had in mind 
was a symbolic gesture such as a quick in-and-out helicopter visit to pray at the grave 
of Cardinal Conway for peace and reconciliation, then there might be comparatively 
few problems and it would present no insurmountable security issues.  If on the other 
hand, the Pope was contemplating an open visit, allowing himself to be seen by and 
to bless thousands of people – perhaps from the steps of Armagh Cathedral – ‘that 
would present security problems so severe that it might be necessary for us to tell the 
Vatican that a visit in these terms could not be contemplated at all.   The risks if a 
spectacular visit of this type were contemplated would certainly go much wider than 
the Pope’s own safety.  Intercommunal violence would be a much stronger possibility 
and one tragic incident could have an incalculable effect on hopes for both peace and 
political progress.’42
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In the event, on Monday August 27, two tragic incidents did occur, but not of 
the type which British officials had in mind.  On that sunny bank holiday morning, an 
IRA bomb tore apart a small pleasure craft off the coast of Mullaghmore in Co. Sligo 
in the Republic, killing the Queen’s cousin Lord Mountbatten, and two teenage boys.  
The eighty-three-year-old Dowager Lady Brabourne died a day later.  Later that 
afternoon, eighteen British soldiers were murdered in a double IRA bomb and gun 
attack at Warrenpoint in Co. Down in Northern Ireland.  Ó Fiaich, in Rome to agree 
details of the Pope’s itinerary, received the news with mounting horror.  ‘At one point 
it came through that there were six dead and there were ten dead and there were 
twelve dead … I could just feel the ground crumbling under my feet.’43  On August 29, 
Crossley was informed by Casaroli that later that day, the Vatican Press Office would 
make an announcement indicating the towns the Pope would visit in Ireland.  It duly 
appeared at 17:00, stating that while initially a visit to the North had not been 
considered, in response to numerous requests from various groups, both Catholic and 
Protestant, a decision in principle was taken with a view to incorporating a visit also to 
Armagh.  ‘But with deep regret due to the dreadful murders of recent days it has now 
been decided not to include a venue in Northern Ireland in the papal itinerary.’44
 
V. Influencing the Pope and Avoiding Embarrassment.
Dreadful as the events of August 27 were, at least for the British Government, 
they removed the security and political difficulties of a papal visit to Armagh.  Their 
attention now turned back to what the Pope would say in one of the several speeches 
he was due to make in the Republic and to try to ensure that no ‘embarrassment’ arose 
from any of them.  This was a real issue for the British, since as one official put it back 
in 1978, ‘an international embarrassment for example with Irish Catholics in the States 
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can mean funds and arms for PIRA.’45  Once again, the government looked to 
Archbishop Heim as ‘a most valuable medium through which to make an attempt to 
influence any public statement on Northern Ireland by Pope John Paul II.’  A meeting 
between him and Humphrey Atkins was arranged for early September, to give time for 
the Vatican to see Heim’s report before the Pope left for Ireland.46  The meeting duly 
took place at the NIO’s London office on 4 September.  Heim immediately said that 
the decision to cancel the visit North had no doubt been a major disappointment to 
Cardinal Ó Fiaich, who, according to Heim, had earlier told the Pope that there ‘was a 
holy war in Ireland’.  He also told Atkins that he was ‘continually trying to counter-
balance the Cardinal’s message to the Vatican.’  Atkins expressed the hope that while 
the Pope was in Ireland he would ‘not be declaring support for Irish unity, since the 
Protestant community would see this as a threat and it would cause political difficulties, 
if not violence.’  Atkins told Heim that he was anxious to encourage political progress 
in Northern Ireland but quickly turned the conversation to eliciting from the Pope an 
appeal to those who used violence, supposedly for political ends, to ‘abandon this 
hopeless course’.  The Archbishop said that ‘he would see what could be done’ and 
promised that he would ‘try to help on the question of the Pope’s statements during 
the visit.  As for the long-term, both he and Cardinal Hume would continue to try to 
curb Cardinal O’Fee’s [sic] nationalistic behaviour.’47
Another avenue of influence on the Pope arose in mid-September, in the person 
of Roy Jenkins, then President of the Commission of the European Communities, and 
a former British Home Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer.  Jenkins was due 
to have a private audience with the Pope and quietly approached the FCO to enquire 
whether there were any points ‘which it would be helpful for him to make’.  Lord 
Carrington was keen for Jenkins to remind the Pope that if he were to say anything 
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publicly which could be interpreted as support for Irish unity, there would be a danger 
of Protestant extremists using the Pope’s words as a pretext for anti-Catholic violence.  
Carrington also urged Jenkins to suggest to the Pope that it would have a profound 
effect, not only in Ireland but also in the United States, if he were able to speak out not 
only against terrorists, but also against those who help, assist, comfort and support 
them, whether actively or passively.  Better still, although Carrington conceded that it 
might be too much to hope for, would be a condemnation by the Pope of terrorist 
organisations by name, both Republican and Loyalist.48
Jenkins duly met the Pope in mid-September.  Their meeting, conducted in both 
French and English was less than satisfactory, since according to Jenkins, the Pope 
was not at ease in either language.49 After a discussion of such matters as the 
development of the Community and international human rights, Jenkins broached the 
subject of Northern Ireland.    The Pope said that there were undoubtedly ‘people 
behind’ such terrorist organisations as the IRA, while he expressed unqualified 
condemnation of the activities and methods of terrorists.  He went on to say that he 
would shortly be going to Ireland where his purpose was to promote the spirit of 
reconciliation.  Jenkins replied that in the Republic, the great majority were against 
violence but there was a minority which gave passive support to it.  It was this minority 
which it was worth seeking to persuade otherwise.  The Pope agreed.  He repeated 
the phrase, ‘minority which gives passive support’ and seemed to register it.
And as well as trying to influence what the Pope would say, the British were 
very keen to influence what he did not say, and that specifically he should make no 
reference to the prison protest.  Again, the activities of the Nuncio Alibrandi in Dublin 
were causing concern.  Back in July, Provisional Sinn Fein, the political mouthpiece of 
the IRA had invited the Pope to meet the H-Block protestors in the Maze, via a letter 
23 | P a g e
to the Papal Nuncio.50  Alibrandi it seems, was willing to help them.  He met a 
delegation from the Belfast Relatives Action Committee at the Papal Nunciature in 
Dublin on July 30 and had apparently assured them that the Pope would ‘indicate 
concern’ about the plight of the men ‘on the blanket’.51  Moreover, in mid-September, 
the Gardaí, the Republic of Ireland police, informed the RUC that the Nuncio would be 
seeking to arrange for ‘suitable parties’ of H-Block protesters to get useful publicity by 
being enabled to meet the Pope and be seen publicly doing so.  Alibrandi’s plan was 
to get his party into the group who would definitely or possibly get to meet the Pope.52  
The British were swift to act to head him off.  Carrington instructed Crossley to ‘let this 
information slip to the authorities in the Vatican’, adding that Alibrandi was ‘notorious 
for his Provo sympathies.’53  Crossley immediately telephoned Monsignor Bačkis, the 
Deputy Foreign Minister, stressing the ‘difficulties’ of the Maze Prison problem, 
implying that it would be a dangerous subject for the Pope to touch upon.  He 
concluded: ‘I feel sure that Bačkis needs no persuading on this.  I only hope that his 
briefing will successfully persuade the Pope.’54  Bačkis later assured Crossley that the 
Vatican had decided ‘at the highest level’ that there must be no contact between the 
papal party and relatives of the Maze prisoners.  The Pope, he said, was writing his 
own speeches on the basis of course of official briefs and was sending his texts down 
for official scrutiny.  Crossley commented: ‘since I have confidence in the soundness 
of the briefers, the only danger lies in ad libs and there we are in the lap of the Pope’.  
His view was that the Pope would doubtless be subjected to pressures by Ó Fiaich 
and Alibrandi but he would be accompanied by Casaroli and Bačkis ‘and it is to be 
hoped that their influence will prevail.’55  
The British were also able to make use of Gerry Fitt MP to help steer the Vatican 
away from the H-Block issue.  In a meeting with the Lord Privy Seal, Ian Gilmour, on 
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26 September, Fitt said that any such references could do irreparable harm in the 
delicate Northern Ireland situation.  He thought that Cardinal Ó Fiaich who came from 
Crossmaglen in the border area, did not really understand the situation in Belfast and 
recent remarks by the Cardinal had been extremely unfortunate.  Fitt suggested 
sending a private and confidential message to the Vatican through FCO channels to 
plead with the Pope to make no mention of the issue.56  Atkins and Gilmour agreed 
with Fitt’s plan and Carrington instructed Crossley to pass on his message.57  It read: 
‘I wish His Holiness the Pope a successful visit to Ireland.  I hope this will lead to a 
cessation of violence.  In all humility however, I must urge His Holiness to make no 
mention of the ‘H’ Blocks, the Maze Prison, Long Kesh.  This is an explosive issue in 
Northern Ireland and touching on such a sensitive question would alienate the 
Protestants and divide the Catholics.’58  The words were Fitt’s own but the actual 
telegram to the Vatican was drafted by Alan Free-Gore of the FCO and approved by 
the NIO.59
VI. Mission Accomplished.
The Pope duly arrived in Ireland on 29 September 1979, to a tumultuous welcome, 
with enormous and overwhelmingly positive media coverage in both parts of Ireland 
and abroad.  The most politically significant of the speeches that he delivered was the 
one at Drogheda on 29 September.  That city is in the diocese of Armagh and yet in 
the Republic.  It was effectively the closest the Pope could get to crossing the border 
without actually doing so.  The Pope acknowledged and gave thanks for his invitation 
to Armagh, and especially noted the fact that the invitation was taken up by 
representatives of the Anglican Church of Ireland and others.  However, he made no 
mention of the events which had led to the cancellation of the visit.  The closest that 
he came to any comment on the political situation in Northern Ireland included remarks 
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to the effect that Christians could not close their eyes to difficult human problems or to 
neglect and refuse to see unjust social or international situations.  He spoke of human 
rights which could not be set aside by the state, not even for security or in the interests 
of law and order.  He said that wherever social, political or economic injustices existed, 
true peace could not exist.  He said that Christianity understood and recognised the 
noble and just struggle for justice.  We must call by name, he said, ‘those systems and 
ideologies that are responsible for this struggle’.  But Christianity was decisively 
opposed to fomenting hatred and to promoting or provoking violence or struggle ‘for 
the sake of struggle’.  Peace, he went on, could never be established by violence.  
Violence was a lie which destroyed what it claimed to defend, and he prayed that no-
one in Ireland ‘may ever call murder by any other name than murder’.   These remarks 
were clearly and specifically aimed at the IRA and their ongoing campaign for ‘political 
status’ for their members in the H-Blocks.  The IRA in their own propaganda referred 
to their terrorist campaign as an ‘armed struggle’.  Their victims, they claimed, were 
not murdered, but were instead ‘legitimate targets.’  The Pope is unlikely personally to 
have been aware of this and several sources have ascribed this section and other 
sections of his speech to Cahal Daly, the Bishop of Ardagh and Clonmacnois, and the 
most outspoken critic in the Irish Hierarchy of the IRA.60  
The most famous passage was again directly addressed to terrorist 
organisations and their supporters.  ‘On my knees I beg you’, he said, ‘to turn away 
from the paths of violence, and to return to the ways of peace.  You may claim to seek 
justice.  I, too, believe in justice and seek justice.  But violence only delays the days of 
justice.  Violence destroys the work of justice.  Further violence in Ireland will only drag 
down to ruin the land you claim to love and the values you claim to cherish.’  He also 
appealed to young people not to listen to voices which speak the languages of hatred, 
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revenge, retaliation.  ‘Do not follow any leaders who train you in the ways of inflicting 
death.  Love life, respect life; in yourselves and in others.’  And to parents, he said: 
‘teach your children how to forgive, make your homes places of love and forgiveness; 
make your streets and neighbourhoods centres of peace and reconciliation.’  And 
finally, addressing political leaders he said: ‘have the courage to face up to your 
responsibility, to be leaders in the cause of peace, reconciliation and justice.  If 
politicians do not decide and act for just change, the field is left open to the men of 
violence.  Violence thrives best when there is a political vacuum and a refusal of 
political movement.’  And he concluded with a prayer:
Christ, Prince of Peace,
Mary, Mother of Peace, Queen of Ireland,
Saint Patrick, Saint Oliver and all
saints of Ireland,
I, together with all those gathered here and with
all who join with me, invoke you:
Watch over Ireland.  Protect humanity.  Amen.61
The Pope’s remarks, and in particular his speech at Drogheda, had a profound 
impact upon all those who heard them.  Newspapers in the North, as well as in the 
Republic carried saturation coverage.  The speech at Drogheda was the centrepiece 
and some important developments were anticipated.  ‘He went to Drogheda …’, said 
one editorial, ‘and spoke words there which cannot be ignored for they enshrine 
sentiments which we will never be able to allow to move to the back of our minds … 
Pope and people united in telling the men of violence to lay down their arms.  We wait 
for the answer to this joint plea.  After it, the face of Northern politics must change.’62  
The British Government were also cautiously optimistic that there might be some 
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positive political consequences from the Pope’s visit, which as Atkins told his 
colleagues, might prove to be ‘significant and beneficial’.  He said the Government 
needed to be ready if faced with a situation they had not discussed, namely an IRA 
ceasefire or offer of a ceasefire conditional upon certain responses from HMG, ‘so that 
we are not exposed to the criticism that we are losing the opportunity which the Pope 
has, almost magically, created.’63  NIO officials were also expecting ‘activity by 
intermediaries both on the possibility of a ceasefire and on the H-Block question, 
although PIRA themselves are unlikely to attempt an approach, at any rate on the first 
issue.’  The officials also detected a ‘weakening of morale among the H-Block 
protestors.’  It was also noted that the Pope’s remarks about a political vacuum were 
‘bound to stimulate pressure in the Republic and the USA for an initiative by HMG. … 
It strengthens the argument for our pushing ahead with our own plans for restoring 
some measure of political life in the Province.’64
In the event, Atkins need not have been concerned about being ‘exposed’, for 
the leadership of the IRA via Provisional Sinn Fein, rejected the Pope’s plea at a 
shambolic press conference in Dublin on 2 October.  The IRA in Belfast issued a 
rambling statement on the same day, which amounted to no more than a grim litany 
of grievances and a perversely selective reading of Irish history.65  On 28 October, the 
IRA murdered a policeman and a British soldier in an attack on a joint patrol in Belfast.  
Equally perverse was the reaction to the speech from some Unionist politicians.  
Paisley again repeatedly referred to the Pope as ‘anti-Christ’ and claimed that his 
suggestion that injustices and social discrimination should take precedence over the 
interests of law and order, had ‘given fuel to the IRA and their violence.’  His colleague 
Peter Robinson announced his intention to write to the Director-General of the BBC 
‘concerning the saturation coverage being given to the events in another state … it is 
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disgraceful that Roman Catholic indoctrination should be given through the BBC.’66  
The Government’s plans for a cross-party conference to promote political progress in 
Northern Ireland fizzled out without issue in March 1980.
So despite the hopes vested in it by some that the Pope’s visit might persuade 
the IRA to call a ceasefire, or persuade the British Government to make some 
concessions to the H-Block protestors, or do something to break up the political logjam 
in Northern Ireland, it did none of these things.  But it was a revealing episode 
nevertheless.  As this study has shown, the British were able to exert considerable 
‘soft power’ in the Vatican via their network of close contacts at the highest levels, 
despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations.  And through quiet but firm 
diplomacy, they achieved their objectives.  One official remarked that ‘we have good 
reason to feel satisfaction with the way in which [the Pope] said nothing which directly 
or indirectly afforded HMG embarrassment.’  This, he argued, was a clear indication 
that the Vatican, from the Secretary of State Casaroli downwards, ‘have a full 
knowledge and understanding of the facts of the Irish problem’, thanks to the efforts 
over many years of the British Legation to the Holy See, ‘and of our good ally, the 
Apostolic Delegate in London, Heim’.67  For Newington at the FCO, ‘from our viewpoint 
it might all have gone a great deal worse!’68  Sinn Fein and the IRA appear to have 
had their own ‘good ally’ in Archbishop Alibrandi.  But he was a political pygmy, in 
comparison to the power and reach of the British diplomatic machine.  Nevertheless, 
this most unpredictable of popes had the British on tenterhooks for a time and it was 
only the atrocities of August 27, which averted for them the diplomatic embarrassment 
of banning John Paul II from a part of the United Kingdom. 
Furthermore, as has been shown here, there were deep divisions in the Vatican 
over Ireland, which were entirely political in nature.  Heim and Hume were Catholics, 
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but any fellow feeling for their co-religionists in Northern Ireland took second place to 
their support for British Government policy, to the extent of their actively working to 
undermine Ireland’s Catholic Cardinal and the representative of the Pope in Dublin.  
Alibrandi appears to have been motivated by anti-Britishness rather than concern for 
‘all people suffering from oppression.’  
However, the episode is revealing also about the true nature of the conflict in 
Northern Ireland, which is too often seen from the outside as an atavistic throwback to 
the religious wars of the past.  For Paisley and his supporters, evangelical 
Protestantism in Ulster was under attack from treacherous local adherents of the 
Vatican in the IRA.  But on his bended knee, Pope John Paul pleaded with the 
Catholics in the IRA to give up their campaign of mayhem and murder.  This had no 
more impact upon them than had the mass excommunication of the Fenians by an 
earlier pope, Pius IX, in 1870.  Like the Fenians, the IRA took ‘their religion from Rome 
and their politics from home.’   Theirs was not a religious war but the same Fenian 
war, to drive the British out of Ireland, once and for all.  It reveals a misunderstanding 
of the nature of the Northern Ireland conflict to have assumed that anything the Pope 
could say, would have made very much difference to gunmen and bombers motivated 
not by religion, but by a furious and unyielding nationalism.  And so great was their 
dedication to their nationalism, that within two years of the Pope’s visit, ten of them 
would starve themselves to death for ‘status’.  We need perhaps to move on from a 
historiography of the Troubles which presents them as an intercommunal struggle 
fuelled by religious bigotry and see them for what they really were: the consequences 
of the actions of a small number of ruthless fanatics in the IRA and their murderous 
loyalist counterparts.  John Paul II shook communism to its foundations.  In 1979, he 
wasted his breath on the IRA.
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